Please write 6-7 pages paper, double spaced, 12-point Times New Roman with 1-inch margins.

It should address ONE of the following prompts, using only lecture notes and Fromkin (Fromkin, David. Europe’s Last Summer: who started the Great War in 1914? Vintage Books. 2005.):

1. Use structural theory to explain the behavior of one major power in 1914.

2. Use institutional theory to explain the behavior of Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Russia in 1914.

3. Explain the security dilemma using WWI data to illustrate it.

4. Use WWI to illustrate the balance of power.

5. Explain the problem or paradox of domestic commitment.

Do not use outside sources!!!!!!

Please use simple words and garmmar, as simple as you can.5 attachmentsSlide 1 of 5

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Lecture 2: April 4 I. The Significance of the WWI case (1914-1918) A. World Historical War* 1. Globalization 2. Totalization – civilian targeting on a massive scale a. The Blockade of Germany B. Path-dependent war (path dependence – present choices, like the war choice in 1914, shaped and constrained future possibilities 1. Explaining WWII and the Cold C. Lease- likely war – The puzzle – war in 1914 seems lease likely outcome of crisis politics given the logic of structural and institutional explanation of war. 1. War choice only if benefits > (greater than) costs. a. This is the rational war choice (rational war choice = RWC) 2. Yet the structure of politics would seem to preclude war given: a. Stable balance of power; 5 =5 3. And given institutional mechanisms to resolve crises *Illustration of destructiveness – Battle of Verdun in WWI = 606,000 dead *Arms buildup since 2008 (to 2018) of 100% or more by major powers in a single region (system) A. Middle East B. Eastern Europe C. Northeastern Asia **Common factors – enhanced conflict and instability A. Middle East – Rise of Iran; Saudi- Israeli Alliance B. Eastern Europe—Russia intervention in Crimea, Georgia, and Ukraine C. Asia—Rise of China *** A. Explanations- structure of domestic factors II. Concepts A. System: A geographic region characterized by long-term patterns of conflict and cooperation. B. Anarchy: the absence of a single center of binding decisions in a system. C. Structure: number of units per system fractured by capabilities (typically, population and economic resources). D. This divides systems into major and minor powers (major power = top power rankings with +6) with capacity to initiate systemic war (powers are states). E. The War Choice: The choice of a state to initiate war: 1. Prerequisites (necessary condition: centralized decision maker like a king, president, party or parliament) 2. War must be CHOSEN, and the choice will tend to be rational in the sense that benefits exceed costs (expected utilities or B>C). F. Adversaries (enemies and allies—allies may become adversaries or conversely, but alliance depend on the benefits of exceeding costs. G. Power resources: Create power in anarchy. III. Concepts A. Balance of Power: the balance of power resources among adversaries Example = military strength B. If a system is in balance, there is no rational/incentive for war (example : 5=5) C. Imbalances of power can generate war given the logic of rising and declining powers. The kind of state can choose war to pre-empt decline or prevent (preempt the rising powers). D. In a balance, peace is self-enforcing (automatic). Lecture 3: April 6 *Credible Commitment – Costly, believable signal * International power is relative power – relative to adversaries and allies A. Europe – 1914 rankings Germany = 4 Great Britain and France = 3 Russia = 2 Austro-Hungary = 1 B. I. Fighting the Cold War – 1945- 1992 The Balance of power at credible commitment A. 1945 – The problem – Balancing to block Soviet expansion (the Polish example) 1. The obvious alliance – Britain, France, Germany – impossible owing to Germany’s defeat in WWII. 2. The alternative and actual alliance- Britain, France, US (NATO) B. The American Commitment 1. Small but significant conventional forces (to Europe) 2. Strategic nuclear shield (Global) 3. Economic aid (Marshall Plan) 4. U.S. accepts despite fierce domestic opposition (both parties) 5. Regular substantial military spending and a mass army (unprecedented levels!) C. Eisenhower’s fear – “the military-industrial complex” (President 1952-60) 1. WWII style mass mobilization would corrupt American civilization through excessive centralization, taxation, regulation and the subordinate of the individual to a security state (not just a fear of group power). D. Eisenhower’s solution – 1. Military strategy- massive retaliation (origins of Triad) 2. Reduction of federal spending and promotion of market-led growth 3. Goal – deterrence of Soviet/Chinese aggression through a credible commitment to massive counter-strikes and the prevention of the development of a permanent security state. a. Promotion of world stability through signaling of credible commitment to protect key allies and the use of trade to create global prosperity. b. Example- the B-52 and the hydrogen bomb; tariff cuts c. Credible commitment to Europe (The NATO tripwire). II. The Soviet Dilemma – the window of strategic inferiority 1948-1970s – Balancing A. During this period, the USSR was at a substantial nuclear disadvantage on land, sea, and air. 1. Possibility – US first strike B. Soviet Deterrence 1. Credible commitment – massive conventional forces capable of overrunning Europe 2. Bluffing-claims of nuclear superiority, space technology advantage 3. Support of the Third World; “revolutions” like Vietnam often fails 4. Negotiation over issues like testing of bombs, use of space. III. Kennedy, the Missile Gap, and the Cuban Missile Crisis A. 1960 Kennedy campaigns against Nixon; claims US has a real strategic disadvantage relative to the USSR. Nixon cannot fully counter without violating national security B. Kennedy wins—dramatically increases nuclear and conventional defense spending (“We will bear any burden, pay any price…” 1. Intervention on Third World (US in Vietnam) C. Was Kennedy bluffing? Did he plan to win the Cold War? IV. The Soviet Calculation A. Given that US has a nuclear advantage, why would Kennedy signal weakness and credibly commit to Arms Race? 1. The possibility of a first strike nuclear capability 2. The neutralization of the Soviet conventional advantage 3. The shifting balance of power 4. Soviet responsive – missiles to Cuba (1962); the Cuban Missile Crisis Section I- IV and the balance of power A. Everything discussed from 1948 to 1962 can be understood as shifts in a dynamic balance of power that operated 1. Regionally (primarily in Europe) 2. Globally (strategic nuclear balance) 1968-1992 The Global Balance A. This period was characterized as stable, but dynamic global balance of power constantly undermined by a long-term nuclear arms race (the Ohio Class Submarine) B. Man on the Moon- 1969 1. 1969 one spillover of the arms race was the moon race 2. The absence of Soviets C. Federal Funding of science and technology V. VI. Notes 4: April 9 I. Information Signaling and Misperception: A. In anarchy, high value information is costly to send and costly to receive because of 1. Bluffing (strategic misrepresentation of preferences for outcomes; like world peace) 2. Translation (of preferences) 3. Lack of enforceability (of threats and bribes) 4. Thus, talk is cheap and behavior is real/ high value a. Example: positioning of fleets (US near N. Korea, Iran, and Russia) B. Credible commitment 1. Believable 2. Because costly 3. Signal 4. Costly to make because of risk (exposure to retaliation); increase of conflict potential. a. US ground force in Korea, Europe b. Positioning of troops creates a hostage and a tripwire C. Deterrence- credible threats and bribes aimed at changing adversaries’ behavior (compelling) or maintaining status quo 1. Balance of power is automatic (passive) deterrence 2. Active deterrence – deterrence that cannot occur without costly action a. Mobilization of military forces b. High alert (ex: Nuclear War Alert) c. Arms expenditure increases ( e: contemporary Middle East – more than 100% increases by Iran, Saudi Arabia and allies; Israel since 2008 II. Misrepresentation and the war choice A. War by error 1. Irrational beliefs (rare) 2. Misperception – false beliefs concerning cause and effect 3. Incomplete information (preferences for war and peace of adversaries) Misperception – the short war illusion (problematic) A. War planners falsely believe that war could be short and decisive (1914) B. Thus, governments falsely chose war when this would inevitably lead to a long war of attrition. Had this been accurate knowledge, war might not have occurred C. The problem – war planners from 1890-1914 knew that industrial weapons would cause mass causalities and could lead to attrition warfare if mass militaries of major powers ( 2 million +/- ) could not achieve quick decisive results. Thus, they rationally chose war plans accordingly 1. First preference strategy decisive offensive 2. Second preference strategy rational attrition D. They chose these plans for the following reasons 1. Offensive necessity, extreme defensive advantage 2. Maximum mobilization, but minimum mobility E. The offensive was necessary for domestic political, economic, and military morale reasons and the need to seize the initiative. III. F. The Russo-Japanese War, the Boer War, as well as the US Civil War had demonstrated the tactical killing power of rapid fire rifles and artillery and machine guns G. Mobilization- railroads and mass conscription guaranteed mass militaries limited only by demography and domestic politics H. Minimum mobility- but, constrained to foot and horse powers; armies must attack or lose initiative for good. Realism ** Structure – WWI A. The paradox of German unification (1870-71) 1. Potential encirclement 2. Potential hegemonic power triggers block strategy by France, Russia, Great Britain B. German strategy: Escape encirclement Allies with Austria-Hungary Gains from trade C. Austria-Hungary: 1914 – the survival threat D. Balance of power – balance breakdown I. Structural theory A. First premise – dichotomous order (hierarchy or anarchy) B. First deduction – the balance of power is a balance of conflict 1. Given power maximization and resource scarcity 2. Maxim: conflict is inevitable, war is always possible C. Second premise – unitary actor (states in anarchy must act as rational individuals or person) (necessity of state) D. Second deduction 1. Rational self-interest 2. Rational self-help (first, best strategy – alliances secondary) 3. Rational distrust: spying and cyber-war II. Structural theory and the origins of war A. Destabilization of the balance of power (balance breakdown) B. Potential hegemon (balance to block its rise) C. Survival threat to one or more major powers D. Security dilemma – relative decline, relative rise (pre-emptive war) E. Power rankings – 1914 Europe 4 = Germany 3 = Great Britain + France 2 = Russia 1 = Austria-Hungary; Germany (Austria ally to balance Britain, France, Russia – Gains from trade alliance) ** U.S. ROK (South Korea) and North Korea (DPRK) A. What incentives does North Korea have to negotiate (bargain)? 1. Shift in the balance of power? i. Strengthening U.S.-ROK-Japan alliance
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